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New Value Exception: (Wanted) Dead or
Alive -

Viability of the "New Value"

Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule
Under Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)
Sara A. Austin*
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, and for years
prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act,' courts have attempted to determine who is entitled to the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale or liquidation of the assets of an insolvent corporation. Early
judicial decisions and subsequent codification of the Act resulted in
the following overriding principle emerging as a condition of confirmation of a plan of reorganization: no creditor junior to any dissenting class of senior creditors may receive or retain any interest under
the plan unless such senior creditors receive payment in full of their
claims. This principle, now referred to as the absolute priority rule,
is most often invoked when stockholders or equity holders expect to
retain some interest under the plan and unsecured creditors of the
debtor will not receive full payment of their claims.2
The absolute priority rule continues to this day to be used as a
yardstick by which a reorganization plan must be measured. 3 Nevertheless, an exception to the absolute priority rule was recognized
under the Act when stockholders contributed new value (usually
capital) while attempting to retain an interest under the plan. This
exception, commonly referred to as the "new value" or "fresh capital" exception, continued to be recognized and invoked until Congress enacted the Code. The Code amended the Act's provisions regarding when a court may confirm a plan of reorganization. The
* Ms. Austin is currently associated with the law firm of Morris & Vedder in York,
Pennsylvania. She was previously the law clerk to the Honorable Ross W. Krumm, United
States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Virginia.
I. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 1I U.S.C. § I et seq. [hereinafter the Act].
2. 11 U.S.C. § I129(b)(2)(B) (1988). The absolute priority rule also applies to other
classes holding interests (other than secured and unsecured creditors) when these other classes
will not receive full payment of their claims, but holders of interests junior to theirs will receive or retain something under the plan. See id. § I129(b)(2)(C). This Article deals only with
the absolute priority rule in respect to the unsecured class, pursuant to § l129(b)(2)(B).
3. See Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended, I I U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. [hereinafter the

Code].
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enactment of these Code provisions gave rise to the present controversy: Did the Code, by codifying the absolute priority rule without
exception, eliminate the previously-recognized exception to the rule,
or, does the exception enjoy continued vitality because the Code did
not explicitly eliminate the exception?
Appellate courts, district courts, and bankruptcy courts are divided on the issue. 4 The Supreme Court has refused to address the
issue and resolve the debate. 5 Only when the Supreme Court rules or
the Congress amends the Code to explicitly include or exclude the
exception will the controversy be resolved. This Article discusses the
history of the absolute priority rule, enactment of the Act and the
Code, and various courts' decisions on post-Code viability of the new
value exception. The Article concludes with an analysis of the current status of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule.
I.

History of the Absolute Priority Rule

The absolute priority rule existed prior to the Act as a principle
of law to be invoked mainly in foreclosure situations. One of the earliest cases recognizing and adhering to the absolute priority principle
is Railroad Co. v. Howard.6 In Howard, bondholders and stockholders of an old railroad company reached an agreement. 7 In ruling in
favor of the creditors' objection to this agreement, the Supreme
Court stated:
Equity regards the property of a corporation as held in trust for
the payment of the debts of the corporation . . . . [T]he rule is
well settled that stockholders are not entitled to any share of the
capital stock nor to any dividend of the profits until all the debts
of the corporation are paid. 8
Additionally, the Court found that "subject to their [bondholders']
lien, the property of the [old] railroad [company] was in the mortgagors, and whatever interest remained after the lien of the mortgages
was discharged belonged to the corporation, and . . . became a fund
4. See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text and notes 46-110 and accompanying
text.
5. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
6. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1868).
7. Id. at 393-96. The agreement provided for the foreclosure of the mortgages, formation of a new company, and conveyance of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale to the
new company. Thereafter, pursuant to the agreement, the old company's stockholders received
a distribution from the foreclosure sales proceeds. General unsecured creditors of the old company objected to the agreement on the ground that the sales proceeds remaining after payment
of the mortgage liens should be distributed to them, rather than to the old stockholders. Id.
8. 74 U.S. at 409-10.
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in trust for the benefit of their creditors." Through this decision, the
Court articulated the principle that after secured creditors receive
payment, unsecured creditors are entitled to payment before any equity or stockholders receive a distribution.
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the principle stated in Howard. In Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co.,1" the
Court extended the Howard holding a step further by requiring judicial condemnation of any situation in which a stockholder received
an interest before full payment was made to all creditors. According
to the court:
[N]o such proceedings can be rightfully carried to consummation which recognize and preserve any interest in the stockholders without also recognizing and preserving the interests, not
merely of the mortgagee, but of every creditor of the corporation
... [A] foreclosure which attempts to preserve any interest or
right of mortgagor in the property after the sale must necessarily secure and preserve the prior rights of general creditors
thereof. This is based upon the familiar rule that the stockholder's interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of
creditors. First, of secured, and then of unsecured, creditors.
And any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate
rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.1"
Similarly, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd," the Court
again reaffirmed the absolute priority principle, stating:
If the value . . .justified the issuance of stock in exchange for

old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that
value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or
only for purposes of control. In either event it was a right of
property out of which the creditors were entitled to be paid
before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose
whatever."3
In Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 4
the Court referred to the above three cases as being authoritative
and standing for the settled doctrine that "to the extent of their
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 414.
174 U.S. 674 (1899).
Id. at 683-84.
228 U.S. 482 (1913).
Id. at 508.
271 U.S. 445 (1926).
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debts creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders against all
the property of an insolvent corporation." 5 The Kansas City Terminal Court held that "[t]his doctrine is the 'fixed principle' according
to which . . . Boyd . . . declares the character of reorganization
agreements must be determined, and to it there should be rigid
adherence."1 "
It should be noted that only the Howard decision antedates enactment of the Act. Additionally, only the last case, Kansas City
Terminal, involved a debtor in the bankruptcy context; the other decisions applied non-bankruptcy foreclosure law. Therefore, only the
Kansas City Terminal Court actually considered the effects of the
absolute priority rule in a bankruptcy context.
II.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not explicitly set forth the absolute priority rule as a part of the statute. 7 Nevertheless, the lower
courts followed the Supreme Court's dictates in Louisville Trust
Co., Boyd, and Kansas City Terminal18 that in order to confirm a
plan of reorganization pursuant to § 77B of the Act, stockholders
could not receive or retain any interest under the plan if creditors
did not receive payment in full of their claims (unless the creditors
accepted the plan's provisions). The phrase "fair and equitable" was
not defined in the Act, and therefore, a court confirming a plan was
required to interpret its meaning. Most courts tended to follow the
absolute priority rule rigidly, along with the other provisions for confirmation as set forth in § 77B.
Notwithstanding the rule's general acceptance, the rule was first
referred to by its present name in 1939. In Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Co., t9 the Court referred to the principle enunciated in Louisville Trust, Boyd, and Kansas City Terminal as "this rule of full
or absolute priority" and found that the "doctrine is firmly embedded in § 77B." 2 °
Id.at 455.
Id. at 454.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 77B provided in relevant part:
(f) After hearing such objections as may be made to the plan, the judge
shall confirm the plan if satisfied that
(I) it is FAIR AND EQUITABLE and does not discriminate unfairly in
favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible . . .(emphasis added).
18. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
19. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
20. Id.at 117, 119.
15.
16.
17.
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The Los Angeles Lumber Court not only referred to the rule by
its present name, but also established the new value exception to the
rule. The Court stated:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under
which stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization
of an insolvent debtor . . . . Especially in the latter case [Kansas City Terminal] did this Court stress the necessity, at times,
of seeking new money "essential to the success of the undertaking" from the old stockholders. Where that necessity exists and
the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in
return a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made. But if these conditions are not
satisfied the stockholder's participation would run afoul of the
ruling of this Court in Kansas City Terminal. .

.

. If, however,

those conditions we have mentioned are satisfied, the creditor
cannot complain that he is not accorded "his full right of priority against the corporate assets."
In view of these considerations we believe that to accord
"the creditor his full rights of priority against the corporate assets" where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder's participation must be based on a contribution in money or money's
worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to
21
the participation of the stockholder.
Until enactment of new provisions for plan confirmation under the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, courts faced with confirmation of a reorganization plan considered the plan both pursuant to the provisions
of § 77B of the Act and in light of the new value exception as recognized in Los Angeles Lumber.
III.

Bankruptcy Code of 1978

Congress enacted the Code in 1978. The absolute priority rule
was codified at I I U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2) as a condition of confirmation of a reorganization plan. 22 That section requires that a plan be
21. Id. at 121-22.
22. II U.S.C. § 1129 (1988). Confirmation of plan.
(b)(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on
account of such junior claim or interest any property.
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considered "fair and equitable" in order to be confirmed, but contains no mention of the new value exception enunciated in Los Angeles Lumber. Congress' failure to mention the new value exception
has been interpreted by courts as either implicitly incorporating the
gloss of the exception into the absolute priority rule or as explicitly
excluding the exception from the Code. These differing interpretations fuel the present controversy.
The legislative history of § 1129(b)(2) is ambiguous concerning
viability of the new value exception. The exception is not discussed
as either being explicitly excluded from the rule or as implicitly incorporated in the rule. The House Report 2" states in relevant part:
The court may confirm over the dissent of a class of unsecured claims

. .

.[but] if the class is impaired, then they must

be paid in full or, if paid less than in full, then no class junior
may receive anything under the plan. This codifies the absolute
priority, rule from the dissenting class on down.
The test to be applied by the court is set forth in the various paragraphs of section 1129(b). The elements of the test are
new departing from both the absolute priority rule and the best
interests of creditors tests found under the Bankruptcy Act. The
court . ..must merely decide whether the plan complies with

the requirements of section 1129(b). If so, the plan is confirmed,
if not the plan is denied confirmation.
The Congressional Record Statements" similarly lacks a reference
to the new value exception. It states:
Section 1129(b) sets forth a standard by which a plan may be
confirmed notwithstanding the failure of an impaired class to accept the plan ....

Paragraph (2) provides guidelines for a court to determine
whether a plan is fair and equitable with respect to a dissenting
class. It must be emphasized that the fair and equitable requirement applies only with respect to dissenting classes. Therefore,
unlike the fair and equitable rule contained in Chapter X and
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act under section 1129(b)(2) senior accepting classes are permitted to give up value to junior
classes as long as no dissenting intervening class receives less
than the amount of its claims in full.
Subparagraph (B) applies to a dissenting class of unsecured
claims . . . . [U]nder clause (ii), the court must confirm the
23. HR. RFP, No,595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 413-18 (1977).
24. 124 Cong. Rec. HI 1103-05 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); S17420-22 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (testimony of Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini).
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plan if the plan provides that holders of any claims or interests
junior to the interests of the dissenting class of impaired unsecured claims will not receive any property under the plan on
account of such junior claims or interests.
In determining the validity of the new value exception in light of
§ 1129(b)(2), courts have come to differing conclusions. The Supreme Court has had an opportunity to resolve the controversy, but
has refused to rule on the issue." This Article next considers the
cases preceding the Supreme Court's refusal to rule on the issue.
IV.

Decisions Preceding Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers

One of the early Code cases dealing with the vitality of the new
value exception is In re Potter Material Services, Inc.28 In Potter,
the Seventh Circuit found that Los Angeles Lumber and subsequent
cases had recognized the new value exception. The court held that
the new value must be substantial and either equal to or greater than
the retained interest.2" The court additionally held that confirming a
plan by means of a cram-down and invoking the new value exception
required a finding by the court that the new value was necessary to
the reorganization. 2" However, Potter did not specifically address the
effect of the Code on the exception and is therefore of no help in
determining the post-Code viability of the exception.
Shortly after the decision in Potter, the Sixth Circuit reached a
similar result. In In re United States Truck Co.,Inc.,2 9 the court held
that the exception recognized in Los Angeles Lumber required that
the new value be essential to the success of the reorganization, an
element to be considered at confirmation.3" The Sixth Circuit, like
the Seventh Circuit, did not expressly address the effect of the Code
on the new value exception and is similarly of no help in the present
controversy.
Bankruptcy courts were also faced with the question of the vitality of the new value exception after enactment of the Code. In In
re Pecht,3 1 the court held that the new value must be provided at
confirmation or on the effective date of the plan, rather than over the
25. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
26. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
27. Id. at 101.
28. Id. at 102.
29. 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
30. Id. at 588.
31. 57 B.R. 137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). The issue arose in the context of approval of
the debtor's disclosure statement. The objecting creditor argued that the disclosure statement
could not be approved because the plan was unconfirmable. Id. at 138.
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life of the plan, in order for a plan to be crammed down over the
dissent of a senior class."a By referring to the time at which the new
value must be contributed, the court implicitly accepted the existence of the new value exception without specifically discussing it.
In a subsequent case, In re A. H. Robins C9., Inc.,aa the same
court again impliedly accepted the viability of the exception. 4 The
Robins court stated in dicta that if the Chapter 11 debtor needed to
confirm a plan by cram-down, then existing equity might need to be
cancelled and new value given in order that the old equity holders be
allowed to continue to manage, and hold some interest in, the debtor
post-confirmation.3 5 However, as neither the Pecht nor Robins decisions expressly mentioned the new value exception, the court may
have been exercising its discretion over plan confirmation rather than
impliedly accepting viability of the exception. These cases could be
viewed as supporting either proposition.
In In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc.,36 the court held that the exception to the absolute priority rule was still viable. However, the
Sawmill decision was based almost entirely on the Potter decision 37
and other cases upholding the exception without detailing any reasoning. A few months after the Sawmill decision, the same court
again stated that the exception was viable and expanded on its reasoning. In In re Olson,a8 the court adopted the Potter conditions for
invoking the new value exception.3 9 The Olson court added that the
new value could not be comprised of future payments from the operation of the debtor's business, citing to Pecht and other cases with
similar holdings for support."' In its holding, the Olson court stated
that because utilization of the exception to obtain confirmation of a
plan involves the relationship of the debtor to a dissenting class of
creditors, a court should consider the amount of new value being
contributed against the amount of unsecured debt held by the dissenting class when making a determination on the substantiality of
32. Id. at 140.
33. 59 B.R. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
34. The Robins court, in discussing why a Chapter II discharge was broader than an
individual debtor's discharge, mentioned the new value exception. Id. at 104.
35. Id.
36. 72 B.R. 454 (Bankr. C.D. 111.1987).
37. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (the controlling law in the Circuit at the time of the
Sawmill decision).
38. 80 B.R. 935 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
39. Potter required that the new value be substantial, equal to or greater than the value
of the interest retained, and up front rather than over the plan's life. 781 F.2d at 101.
40. Olson, 80 B.R. at 937.
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the new value.4" Notwithstanding this explanation, the court dealt
only briefly with the Code's effect on viability of the exception, and
the decision is therefore of limited aid in the controversy over viability of the exception.
In one of the last decisions issued before Ahlers, the court in In
re Future Energy Corp.,42 recognized the exception's validity."3 Also
relying on Potter, the court elaborated on the requirement that the
contribution must be in money or money's worth. The court stated
that the contribution could include a variety of situations where the
new value benefits the debtor and puts the shareholder in a position
of economic risk, including guaranty of a debt, release of a claim, or
payment of attorney fees.4 4 Following the dictates of Pecht, the Future Energy court held that the contribution must be present, and
not a future contribution.4 5 However, the court did not address postCode viability of the exception, but merely assumed its validity
based on a reliance on Potter.
V.

Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers

A seminal decision in the controversy over the viability of the
new value exception is Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers.4 In
Ahlers, the Supreme Court conceded the existence of a controversy,
47
but expressly refused to resolve it.
The debtors in Ahlers filed their Chapter I1 petition and plan
of reorganization in order to forestall state court replevin proceedings brought against their farm equipment by the Bank which held a
security interest in the equipment. 4 8 The Bank filed motions for relief from the automatic stay.4 9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that the motions should be stayed pending a determination by
the District Court of the plan's feasibility.50 After finding the plan
unfeasible, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's initial
grants of relief from the stay.5 Relying on Los Angeles Lumber, the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the debtors' retention of equity
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
83 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
485 U.S. 197 (1988).
Id. at 203 n.3.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 200 (1988).
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in the farm, along with contributions of labor, expertise and experience (referred to as "sweat equity"), met the requirement of contributing money or money's worth in order to invoke the new value exception and allow confirmation of the plan. 2 After the Court of
Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.53
The Court stated that the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Los Angeles Lumber was misplaced, finding that Los Angeles Lumber had
rejected the idea that "sweat equity" could be considered a contribution of money or money's worth. 4 The Solicitor General, in a brief
on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, had asked the
Court to extend its reversal of the Eighth Circuit and hold that enactment of the Code eliminated the new value exception to the absolute priority rule. 56 However, the Court stated:
The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to reverse the
Court of Appeals ruling and hold that codification of the absolute priority rule has eliminated any "exception" to that rule
suggested by Los Angeles Lumber ....
We need not reach this question to resolve the instant dispute ....
Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any comment on the continuing vitality of the Los Angeles Lumber exception-a question which has divided the lower courts since
passage of the Code in 1978 .... 11
The Court held that even if the exception were viable, the case
before it did not fulfill the conditions necessary to invoke the exception and confirm the plan. 57 The Supreme Court's failure to resolve
the controversy left the issue open to continuing and varying interpretation by the lower courts.
VI.

Decisions Subsequent to Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers

The lower courts have taken varying positions in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers."8
Some courts have held that the exception survived enactment of the
Code while others have held that codification of the absolute priority
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 203 n.3.
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988).
Id.
485 U.S. 197 (1988).
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rule is exclusive. A few courts have refused to rule on the issue.
A.

Exception Continues Viable

59
One of the first decisions issued after Ahlers was In re Henke.
The Henke court first noted that Ahlers specifically did not rule on
whether the new value exception survived the enactment of the Code
and that lower courts were split on the issue.6 0 The court then
adopted the rationale of Potter" and held that use of the exception
is implicit in approving a plan under the cram-down provisions. 2 Accordingly, one could say that the Henke decision was based on preAhlers case law that itself did not address the Code's effect on the
exception.
Soon after Henke, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri held in In re 47th & Belleview Partners63 that the
exception continued in effect after the Code was enacted." The Belleview court found the exception functional, but held that more was
required than the mere assumption of an economic risk by the stockholder or equityholder (as required by the court in In re Future Energy Corp.) to meet the exception's requirements.6 5 However, the rationale as to continued viability of the exception was not detailed and
is of little help as precedent.
The court in In re Sherwood Square Ass'n66 reached a similar
result, holding that the new value exception was presumed to be viable because Ahlers had not specifically eliminated the exception.0 7
The court in In re Snyder6 8 reached the same result, but elaborated
on the reasoning for holding that the exception retained its validity.
The court noted that Ahlers had left open the question of post-Code
validity of the new value exception, and that other cases 9 had
merely assumed its continuing vitality without discussing the basis
for their reasoning. 70 The Snyder court reasoned that the exception
had been recognized under the Act, but that different provisions

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Material
70.

90 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988).
Id. at 453.
In re Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
Henke, 90 B.R. at 455.
95 B.R. 117 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
Id. at 119.
Id. (citing In re C&P Gray Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)),
107 B.R. 872 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989).
Id. at 887.
99 B.R. 885 (Bankr. C.D. II1. 1989).
Including In Re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) and In re Potter
Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
In re Snyder, 99 B.R. at 887.
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were applicable pursuant to Code § 1129. The court held that the
exception remains viable until a higher court rules that enactment of
the Code eliminated the exception.7" Upon examining the legislative
history, the court further held that nothing it had reviewed evidenced an intent by Congress in enacting § 11.29 to eliminate an
exception deeply rooted in bankruptcy law. 72 The Snyder case is
therefore one of a few post-Ahlers decisions actually examining the
issue in depth before making a determination as to the exception's
viability.
Another often cited decision is In re Yasparro." In Yasparro,
the court held that the exception retained its validity under the Code
provisions.74 The reasoning in Yasparro was similar to that in In re
Snyder7 and should be treated in the same vein.
In a decision discussing the requirements for the contribution in
order to invoke the exception, the court in In re Ashton 6 merely
cited Los Angeles Lumber's recognition of the new value exception
in support of its position that the exception was still viable. 77 Similarly, the court in In re Aztec Co.7" relied almost solely on the Sixth
Circuit's decision in In re U.S. Truck Co.,79 a case that contained no
rationale for its decision, in holding that the exception was valid.
Neither Ashton nor Aztec dealt with the exception in regard to enactment of the Code and viability thereafter.
The court in In re Pullman Construction Industry, Inc.80 held
that the new value exception was functional post-Code as being a
necessary and obvious corollary to the codification of the absolute
priority rule.8 The court also looked to both the legislative history of
§ 1129(b) and the judicial gloss of the exception as recognized by
Los Angeles Lumber8 2 and determined that § 1129(b) does not mod83
ify the judicial gloss in such a way that the exception is eliminated.
But, as with decisions from other courts, the Pullman court did not
71. Id. at 888-89.
72. Id. at 888.
73. 100 B.R. 91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
74. Id. at 96. See also In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 307 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), a later
decision by the same court reaching the same result.
75. 99 B.R. 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989). See supra notes 6.5-69 and accompanying text.
76. 107 B.R. 670 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
77. Id. at 674.
78. 107 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
79. 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
80. 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
81. Id. at 945 (citing In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) and In re
Snyder, 99 B.R. 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989)).
82. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
83. Pullman Construction, 107 B.R. at 946.
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address the language of § 1129(b), but merely looked to the legislative history and existing case law.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
also upheld the validity of the new value exception in In Re 222
Liberty Assoc.."' The court noted that the exception was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Los Angeles Lumber, and the exception
was neither discredited nor eliminated by the decision (specifically
note 3) in Ahlers.8 5 The Liberty court reviewed other courts' decisions and found that the majority position was that the exception
survived enactment of the Code. 80 The court in Liberty specifically
declined to follow the decision of In re Winters,8" discussed below. 88
Again, the court did not look to all of the language of the statute in
making its determination as to viability.
In an opinion issued soon after the decision in Liberty, the court
in In re Mortgage Inv. Co.8 9 held that the exception as recognized by
Los Angeles Lumber had survived enactment of the Code, and therefore, the requirements set forth in Los Angeles Lumber" needed to
be met to confirm a plan after invocation of the exception. 91 The
court also cited to the Bankruptcy Court's decision in In re Greystone III Joint Venture9 2 for the proposition that the exception was
viable.93
B. Neutral as to Vitality of Exception
A few courts have refused to rule on the viability of the exception in relation to enactment of the Code. In a case decided soon
after Ahlers, the court in In re Rudy Debruyker Ranch, Inc.9" held
that even if the exception did exist, the new value contributed must
be at least 100% of the amount of unsecured debt.9 5 The court inferred from Ahlers that no exception exists except when the above
84. 108 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
85. Id. at 983-84.
86. Id. at 984.
87. 99 B.R. 658 (Bankr, W.D. Pa. 1989).
88. In re 222 Liberty Assoc., 108 B.R. 971, 985 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
89. II1 B.R. 604 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
90. These requirements are reasonable equivalence of the interest being contributed and
the interest being retained, the contribution being in money or money's worth, and the necessity of the new value to the success of the reorganization. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber,
308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939). See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
91. In re Mortgage Inv. Co., Il1 B.R. 604, 618 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
92. 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), affid, 127 B.R. 138 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990), rev'd, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991).
93. In re Mortgage Inv. Co., Ill B.R. at 618.
94. 84 B.R. 187 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988).
95. Id. at 190.
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condition is fulfilled.9 6 By requiring that the contribution at least pay
out the unsecured debt, the court in essence adhered to the absolute
priority rule (because the unsecured creditors would receive full payment), but merely allowed the funds necessary to effectuate the plan
to come from a source other than the debtor.
In a later case, In re Lettick Typografic, Inc. 9 7 the court
tracked the language of the Supreme Court in the Ahlers decision.98
After considering the language, the court made no ruling as to the
vitality of the exception, but merely issued a statement similar to
Ahlers that even if the exception did exist, the plan did not meet the
conditions for confirmation.9 9
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2 v. First Bank'00 stepped back from its earlier position in In re
Potter Materials Serv., Inc.'01 and specifically remained neutral on
post-Code viability of the exception. The court merely stated, as if
tracking the language of Ahlers, that even if the exception was viable, the contribution in that case did not meet the exception. 102 However, the court did state that the Code provisions allow a creditor to
retain control by consenting to the plan and waiving the absolute
priority rule,' 0 a and also stated that recognizing the exception gives
the presiding court, rather than the creditors, the power to waive the
absolute priority rule.'0 4 In addition, the court noted that the Code
differs from the Act in that the Code defines "fair and equitable"
and requires approval by consent of a majority of each class.10 5 The
Code also differs from the Act in that the presiding court has no
authority if not specifically provided for in the Code.' 06 The Seventh
Circuit found that the legislative history of the section reinforces the
implication that the statute has no viable exception. 07 Nevertheless,
the court did not rule on the issue as it found the contribution in the
case was insufficient if the exception were invoked, but rather left it
open for future consideration.
96. Id.
97. 103 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
98. Id. at 35.
99. Id.
100. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
101. 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 26-28 End accompanying text.
102. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1362.
103. Id. at 1360.
104. Id. This is because the Act had required a plan to be "fair and equitable," while
also allowing impaired creditors to accept the plan if by unanimity, whereas the Code differs
by requiring the consent of each class. Id. at 1360-61.
105. Kham & Nates Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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C.

Code Eliminated Exception

Five courts have ruled that the enactment of the Code eliminated any previously recognized exception to the absolute priority
rule."0 8 In In re Winters,"0 9 the court stated that adherence to the
absolute priority rule is to be strict."' The court reasoned that the
Code supplies the definition of "fair and equitable" that is to be applied when a class rejects the plan and the proponent invokes the
cram-down provisions."' The court further reasoned that the definition makes no mention of the exception." 2 Therefore, based on what
it considered to be the unambiguous language of § 1129(b), the
court held that the exception was eliminated upon enactment of the
Code.1 3 This view - considering the language of the Code as specifically excluding the exception by having no reference to it - is
becoming more prevalent among courts faced with the issue.
The court in In re Drimmel,"' followed Winters and held that
the exception was eliminated by enactment of the Code. The Drimmel court considered the lower court's holding in Greystone,"15 but
then found that the Code definition of "fair and equitable" provides
no exception."' The Drimmel court held that Congress codified the
absolute priority rule without exception, and therefore the rule must
be met without exception in order for the plan to be confirmed." 7
The court in Drimmel joined the Winters' "progeny" in equating no
mention of the exception with non-existence of same.
In In re Lumber Exchange Ltd. Partnership,"8 the court also
adopted the emerging, but minority, position that the exception has
been eliminated. The court discussed evolution of the absolute priority rule and new value exception under both the Act and Code." 9
The court found that confirmation under the Act required both that
the plan be fair and equitable to each dissenting creditor and that
new value be contributed if the absolute priority rule was not to be
108. See infra notes 112-36 and accompanying text.
109. 99 B.R. 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
110. Cf. id. at 663.
111. Id. at 663.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 108 B.R. 284 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
115. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D, Tex. 1989), aff'd,
127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991). See infra notes 134-37
and accompanying text.
116. Drimmel, 108 B.R. at 289.
117. Id. at 289-90.
118. 125 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D, Minn. 1991).
119. Id. at 1006-08.
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met.12 The court found likewise that the Code changed the conditions for confirmation so that the provisions applied to dissenting
classes and a definition of fair and equitable became statutory. 1
Therefore, a court is required to go no further than the Code provisions.122 Additionally, the court found that under the Act the new
value exception applied to a minority of creditors after a majority of
the class had accepted the plan, leaving no issue of absolute priority,
whereas under the Code, the absolute priority rule must still be met
if a class rejected the plan.' 23 The Lumber Exchange court, upon
accounting for the difference between the Act and Code language,
concluded that no exception existed to the absolute priority rule
upon codification of § 1129(b).1 2
A recent decision on the issue of vitality of the new value exception also takes the minority position that the exception was eliminated by enactment of the Code. The court in In re Outlook/Century, Ltd.'25 issued a thorough and reasoned decision after reviewing
numerous other decisions on the issue. The court noted that Ahlers
remained noncommittal and decisions of the Courts of Appeal varied
on the issue. 2 ' The Outlook/Century court also reviewed bankruptcy
court decisions, finding that they too varied between those accepting
viability of the exception without explanation or in dictum and those
few applying the exception by relying on Congress having not specifically disapproved of the exception. 27
Following the decisions of Winters and Lumber Exchange, the
court held that the new value exception did not survive enactment of
the Code because the language of the Code defines fair and equitable with minimum standards to be met. 26 In addition, the court
found that elimination of the exception upon enactment of the Code
did not conflict with the legislative history of § 1129(b) because the
120. Id. at 1006-07.
121. Id. at 1007.
122. In re Lumber Exchange Ltd. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000, 1007 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1991).
123. Id. at 1007 n.10.
124. Id. at 1009.
125. 127 B.R. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
126. Id. at 655. Compare Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1990) (probably no longer viable) with In Re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.
1986) (found viable but no reason given).
127. In re Outlook/Century, Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 655-56 nn.8, 9 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1991) (citing to In Re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989),
affd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991); In Re Henke, 90
B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); In Re 222 Liberty Assoc., 108 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990)).
128. Id. at 656.
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Code replaced the judicial gloss on fair and equitable with a statutory definition containing no exception.' 2 9 Also, the court found that
the Code provision makes an exception unnecessary because a plan
not meeting the absolute priority rule can still be confirmed if all
unsecured classes accept the plan. 3 ° Continuing, the Outlook/Century court held that a literal interpretation of § 1129(b) does not
conflict with bankruptcy policy as a plan is only unconfirmable when
the unsecured creditors reject it and they are not paid in full under
the plan.' When this occurs, the debtor usually has no equity and
the unsecured creditors "own" the debtor (rather than the stockholders owning the debtor).1 "2 The court concluded that the exception is
inconsistent with creditor control as provided by the Code, and
33
therefore, the exception did not survive enactment of the Code.1
The rationale of the Outlook/Century court as to retaining creditor
control of the confirmation process is similar to that of the court in
Kham & Nate's Shoes.
The most recent decision regarding viability of the new value
exception was issued in November 1991. The Fifth Circuit, in In re
Greystone HI Joint Venture,'" held that the exception was eliminated upon enactment of the Code. The Bankruptcy Court and District Court's conclusions that the exception remained viable postCode were based on several factors: (1) the exception did not undercut the function of the absolute priority rule as codified because confirmation may occur regardless of the rule if all creditors consent;
(2) the exception is not really an "exception," but rather an "expansion" of the fair and equitable standard; and (3) Congress knew of
the exception's gloss and its presumed validity if no specific repudia3 5

tion were enacted.1

However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower courts. The Court
of Appeals found that the Code's flexibility makes the exception unnecessary.' The Circuit Court also disagreed with the debtor's linguistical argument, holding that the language of § I129(b) sets forth
a minimum standard to be met, which would be lessened if the new
129. Id.
130. Id. at 657.
131. Id.
132. In re Outlook/Century, Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 657 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
133. Id. at 658.
134. 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 127 B.R. 138 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990), rev'd, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991).
135. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 574, 575 n.20.
136. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 143 (5th Cir. 1991).
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value exception were viable.137 This decision is the first to expressly
deal with the statute's language, but follows those other cases holding that the no new value exception remains viable.
VII.

Conclusion

While there is no definitive ruling from the Supreme Court as to
whether the new value exception to the absolute priority rule survived enactment of the Code, various lower courts have ruled on the
issue. The majority position is that until Congress or the Court specifically repudiates the exception, the exception remains viable as
having been recognized through the judicial gloss on the absolute
priority rule. Other, and fewer, courts have maintained a neutral position, preferring instead to wait for resolution by the Court or Congress. Some courts have merely held that the facts in the case at
hand did not meet the exception even if the exception survived the
Code. Still other courts have taken the minority, but emerging position that the Code language is clear and unambiguous, and therefore, the exception did not survive enactment of the Code as no mention of an exception is made in the definition of fair and equitable.
In considering the controversy, it should be recognized that the
canons of statutory construction require a court to follow the dictates
of a statute if it is clear and unambiguous. The courts that have
concluded no exception exists pursuant to the language of the Code
appear to be taking this procedure to heart; an example is the decision by the Fifth Circuit in Greystone. However, a stumbling block
in applying this approach to the present controversy is that the.language of § 1129(b) does not entirely support the conclusion. The
language calls into question what has been called by some courts the
"clear and unambiguous" nature of the statute by providing that
"the conditions that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a
class includes the following requirements . . .. "I
"Includes" is not a word of limitation as the Greystone decision
concludes, but rather one used to precede a non-exhaustive list of
some of the terms or conditions contained within the definition.
Therefore, it is not clear and unambiguous that the definition eliminates the new value exception. Rather, it appears from the language
only that Congress required at least those things listed in order for a
plan to be considered fair and equitable. There is no mention in the
definition that the list is all-inclusive or that no other terms may be
137.
138.

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
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considered by a court in determining whether the plan is fair and
equitable. This aspect of interpreting § 1129(b), in light of Congress'
choice of the word "includes," has not been specifically addressed by
the courts and is important in determining viability of the exception
in the context of confirmation of a plan by cram-down.
Until either the Supreme Court or Congress makes a conclusive
resolution of the controversy about the validity of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule, it appears that each court facing confirmation of a plan by cram-down must use its own discretion
or the binding law of the Circuit within which the court is located in
determining the viability of the exception. This will in turn lead to
an even greater confusion on the part of plan proponents attempting
to utilize the cram-down provisions of § 1129(b), and possibly to
venue-shopping as debtors seek a court which has taken a position
favorable to the debtor's specific fact situation. Creditors will also
attempt to transfer the case to a court which has taken the position
favorable to them. Neither the uncertainty as to the existence of a
new value exception nor the possibility of venue-shopping will further the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code which is to provide a
framework in which the Chapter 11 debtor may achieve a fresh start
after a successful reorganization.

